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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

KERRY SORENSEN

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

J
!

VS.

MIRIAM MORRISON
Defendant/Appellant.

J\
:
;

Case No. 930806 CA
Priority No. 15

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant Miriam Morrison ("Morrison") appeals the decision
of the Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, State of Utah,
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code §78-2a-3(d).
STATEMENTS OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Can a tenant, on equal standing with another tenant, and

without the consent or knowledge of the property owner, use our
State's unlawful detainer statute to evict the other tenant?
Because the trial court's decision on this issue rests on
both statutory interpretation and legislative intent, the court
should apply the "correction of error" standard of review.

Standard Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Kirkbride, 821
P.2d 1136 (Utah 1992).
2.

What standard should be applied in unlawful detainer

actions in determining whether a tenant may be evicted as a
nuisance?
Because the trial court's decision on this issue rests on
both statutory interpretation and legislative intent, the court
should apply the "correction of error" standard of review.
Standard Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Kirkbride, 821
P.2d 1136 (Utah 1992)•
3,

Did Morrison's acts, as found by the trial court, as a

matter of law, amount to a nuisance for which a tenant may be
evicted?
Because neither party is challenging the findings of fact
entered by the trial court, but Morrison is instead challenging
the application of those facts to the standard determined by the
court to be applicable, this issue is a question of law and the
court should apply the "correction of error" standard of review.
Standard Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Kirkbride, 821
P.2d 1136 (Utah 1992).

2

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutes are controlling in this action:
Utah Code §78-36-3
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less
than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer:
(b)(i) . . • in cases where the owner, his
designated agent, or any successor in estate
of the owner • • . has served notice
requiring him to quit;
(d) . . . when he sets up or carries on any
unlawful business on or in the premises, or when he
suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises
any nuisance . . . and remains in possession after
service upon him of a three days' notice to quit;
Utah Code §78-36-5
A tenant may take proceedings similar to those
prescribed in this chapter to obtain possession of the
premises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful
detention of the premises underlet to him.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Appellee Kerry Sorensen ("Sorensen") and Morrison, along
with one other person signed a lease as tenants and were
roommates living in a house in Midvale, Utah.

[R. 26, 34] The

parties lived together for about a month and a half when Sorensen
filed an unlawful detainer action against Morrison under Utah
Code §78-36-3(1)(d).

[R. 1] Morrison moved to dismiss
3

Sorensen's action on the basis that she was a co-tenant and
roommate in the same house, and that Sorensen could not bring an
unlawful detainer action against her because their relationship
was not one of landlord and tenant.

[R. 9]

The trial court

rejected Morrison's argument and after finding her to be a
nuisance ordered her evicted from the premises she had rented.
[R. 31]

Morrison now appeals the decision of the lower court.

B„

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below

This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Michael
L. Hutchings on December 1, 1993, in the Third Circuit Court,
Salt Lake Department.

[R. 26, 34]

The Court heard testimony

from numerous witnesses, including the parties.

[R. 42]

Following this testimony and closing arguments from counsel, the
Court orally entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order.

[R. 42]

These findings were later reduced to writing,

signed by the Court, and are the subject of this appeal.

[R. 26,

34]
C.

Statement of the Facts

After responding to an advertisement for a roommate placed
by Sorensen, Morrison entered into an agreement with Sorensen and
JoAnne Wolfenden to lease a house as co-tenants.

[R. 26, 44-46]

Each roommate signed the lease agreement, making each co-tenant
jointly and severally liable for the covenants contained in the
4

lease.

[R. 26, 34]

The parties in this case did not get along almost from the
beginning of the lease.

[R. 44-46]

They did not communicate

well, did not spend time in each other's company, and could not
agree on who was entitled to use the common areas of the house.
[R. 44-46]

In addition, Sorensen was conducting a business from

the living room of the house, an activity that was not part of
the parties' agreement.

[R. 44-46] Morrison attempted to deal

with this uncomfortable situation by suggesting that the parties
attend mediation together.

[R.45]

Sorensen was unresponsive to

this idea, and instead served Morrison with a three-day notice to
quit for nuisance on November 11, 1993.

[R. 4-5]

When Morrison did not vacate the premises, Sorensen served
her with a summons and complaint on November 23, 1993, claiming
under Utah Code §78-36-3(1)(d) that Morrison was in unlawful
detainer.

[R. 1-5]

He alleged that Morrison was a nuisance in

that she had disrupted his business dealings by erasing messages
from an answering machine, removing a note from the door to the
house, causing a fire hazard by using the stove, and disturbing
his sleep.

[R. 4-5]

Morrison answered Sorensen's complaint on

November 29, 1993, and moved to dismiss the action based on the
fact that Sorensen was a tenant on equal standing with herself
and therefore the remedies under Utah's Unlawful Detainer Statute
5

were not available to him.

[R. 9-12]

On December 1, 1993, the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings
denied Morrison's motion to dismiss and orally ordered Morrison
to vacate the premises she had rented.

[R. 26, 34]

Judge

Hutchings' decision was reduced to a written Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order on December 23, 1993.

[R. 26, 34]

Morrison filed her Notice of Appeal on December 15, 1993.

[R.

29]
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This court should overturn the decision of the lower court
because Sorensen is not a landlord and therefore is not entitled
to relief under the unlawful detainer statute.
This court should find that in order to be evicted as a
nuisance, a tenant must continuously or repeatedly engage in
behavior that substantially and unreasonably, in light of the
circumstances surrounding of the tenancy, interferes with the
rights of another of the landlord's tenants.

By applying this

standard to the facts at hand, this court should hold that
Morrison was not a nuisance and should therefore reverse the
decision of the trial court.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
A TENANT ON EQUAL STANDING WITH ANOTHER TENANT IS NOT
ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER UTAH'S UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE,
Sorensen is not entitled to relief under Utah's unlawful
detainer statute because the parties in this action are cotenants, not landlord and tenant, or tenant and subtenant, as is
required under this statute.

Utah case law, decisions from other

jurisdictions, and an examination of our own unlawful detainer
statute shows that the remedy of a summary eviction is only
available to a landlord in a landlord and tenant relationship.
Utah Code §78-36-3 states that:
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less
than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer:
(d) . . . when he sets up or carries on any
unlawful business on or in the premises, or when he
suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises
any nuisance . . . and remains in possession after
service upon him of a three days' notice to quit;
This section indicates that a tenant may be evicted for nuisance,
but it does not indicate who can maintain the action to evict.
The statute in another section does refer to who may serve
an eviction notice.

Utah Code §78-36-3 (l)(b)(i) provides for an

eviction at the end of a rental period and states that "the
owner, his designated agent, or any successor in estate of the
owner" may serve a notice terminating a tenancy under this
provision.
7

Further, Utah Code §78-36-5 states specifically that "[a]
tenant may take proceedings similar to those prescribed in this
chapter to obtain possession of a premises let to an undertenant
in case of the unlawful detention of the premises let to him."
Such specific language in this section of the code indicates that
the legislature intended to limit unlawful detainer actions to
parties whose relationship is either one of landlord and tenant,
or tenant and subtenant (which is in actuality a landlord and
tenant relationship).
Sorensen should therefore be precluded from maintaining his
action against Morrison because he is not in the position of a
landlord with his co-tenant.
The Supreme Court of Utah addressed this question in 1925.
The Court stated that

,f

[i]f the defendant is not the tenant of

the plaintiff. . . he has a full and complete defense to the
action."

Williams v. Nelson, 237 P. 217, 222 (Utah 1925).

Decisions from other jurisdictions and accepted "black
letter law" agree that this interpretation of summary eviction
proceedings is the correct one.

Nearly every jurisdiction in the

country has an eviction statute similar to Utah's and many courts
have held that the remedy of a summary eviction is only available
to a landlord against their tenant.
Corpus Juris Secundum states that as "a general rule under
8

the various statutes, a relationship of landlord and tenant must
exist between the parties to sustain a summary proceeding to
recover possession of the premises."

52A C.J.S. §752 b.(l).

The Supreme Court of Montana has stated that "[w]henever the
unlawful detainer statutes . . . are brought into operation it is
the rule that such an action may only prevail where the relation
of landlord-tenant exists."

Kransky v. Hensleigh, 409 P.2d 537,

539 (Mont. 1965).
The California Supreme Court agreed as long ago as 1917.
That court stated that "[t]he action of unlawful detainer can be
maintained only where the relation of landlord and tenant
subsists between the parties to the action and hence it becomes
material to determine whether parties stand in that relation to
each other."

Francis v. West Virginia Oil, 162 P.394 (Cal.

1917).
There is other relevant Utah case law which should be
considered in connection with this question.

In 1979 the Utah

Supreme Court stated that the "unlawful detainer statute is a
summary proceeding and in derogation of the common law.

It

provides a severe remedy, and this Court has previously held that
it must be strictly complied with before the cause of action may
be maintained."
1979).

Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852, 853 (Utah

See also, American Holding Co. v. Hanson, 464 P.2d 592
9

(Utah 1970);

Van Zwerden v. Ferrar, 393 P.2d 468 (Utah 1964);

Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952).
The Court discussed this statute again in 1991 stating that
the "statute grants the landlord a summary court proceeding to
evict a tenant who has violated some express or implied provision
of the lease."
(Utah 1991).

P.H. Investment v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1020

The court continues, recognizing that this is a

remedy only available to landlords: "The remedy for a successful
landlord is restitution of the premises, treble damages, and
recovery for waste and rent due."

818 P.2d at 1020 (emphasis

added).
A summary eviction through the unlawful detainer statute is
a remedy available only to landlords.

However, a tenant

experiencing problems with another tenant is not without a
remedy.

That remedy is to notify the landlord of the problems

and allow the landlord to take action.
provide quiet enjoyment to each tenant.

The landlord covenants to
If the landlord is

notified of a breach of this covenant, it is the landlord who
must take action to rectify the situation.
POINT TWO
THIS COURT SHOULD DEFINE A NUISANCE STANDARD
APPLICABLE TO UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTES.
While there is case law in Utah concerning nuisance in other
settings, these standards do not apply specifically to
10

landlord/tenant relationships•

This court should adopt a

standard combining established nuisance definitions with the
decisions from courts that have considered this question as it
relates to the landlord and tenant relationship.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that
every person has a right to use his own
property as he sees fit so long as that use
does not invade the rights of his neighbor
unreasonably and substantially. Absolute
quiet and repose is impossible and everyone
must assume some burden of ordinary
activities of others in the vicinity.
Johnson v. Mount Qqden, 460 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1969).

The

theory that circumstances surrounding the activity in question
should be considered developed into a series of factors in the
state of New York.
[T]enants are bound to a rule of reasonable
conduct, taking into consideration the
housing accommodations, the environment, the
neighborhood, the size of the family, and the
ordinary conduct of people living under the
conditions in question. The application of
this rule requires recognition of the acute
housing shortage but it also demands that the
tenant conduct himself as a reasonable person
over a period of time, having regard to the
comfortable enjoyment of the premises by
others.
DiLella v. O'Brien, 68 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (City Court of Albany
1946) .
The Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has stated that for a landlord to show a nuisance "there must be
11

a continuousness or recurrence of the things, facts, or acts
which constitute the nuisance, deriving from the notion of
unreasonable use."

Reese v. Wells, 73 A.2d 899, 902 (Municipal

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 1950).

The Utah

Supreme Court agreed in stating that in order to sustain a
finding of nuisance it must be demonstrated that "the actor
maintained the condition after he knew that it was causing an
invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land,"
Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573, 577 (Utah
1985) .
Finally, the conduct must actually disturb another tenant in
order to constitute a nuisance.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey

for example, held that "it is not enough that the tenant's
conduct is disturbing; it must be disturbing to other tenants of
the landlord."

Seidel v. Cahaila, 29 A.2d 628, 629 (N. J. 1943)

Morrison requests that this court find that in order to be
evicted as a nuisance, a tenant must continuously or repeatedly
engage in behavior that substantially and unreasonably, in light
of the circumstances surrounding the tenancy, interferes with the
rights of another of the landlord's tenants.

12

POINT THREE
MORRISON'S ACTS DID NOT AMOUNT TO A NUISANCE
By applying the standards discussed above, this court should
find as a matter of law that Morrison's actions did not
constitute a nuisance. At the center of Sorensen's complaint was
the allegation that Morrison interfered with his business.

It

should be noted that the parties signed a residential lease and
therefore Sorensen could not reasonably expect an atmosphere that
would allow business activities.

[R. 44-46]

Business dealings

in a house with two other roommates is an unusual practice and
Sorensen's behavior was a nuisance as to Morrison.
This was a situation where three roommates chose to move in
together.

[R. 26, 34]

In such a situation each roommate needed

to make special accommodations for the others. Nevertheless in
this case Sorensen expected to hold business meetings in the
home.

[R. 44-46]

This was an unrealistic expectation.

Sorensen

considered the usual activities of residential living an
interference.

While it is clear that the roommates were not

getting along, Morrison's actions were not repeatedly invasive to
the point where an eviction should have been ordered.

As

Morrison suggested, mediation may have been a fitting response to
this situation, an eviction was not.
Sorensen complained that Morrison boiled turkey parts on the
13

stove all night creating a fire hazard, lost telephone messages,
removed a note from the front door, interfered with his sleep and
in general interfered with his business.

[R. 44-46]

Viewed in

the context of a residential rental agreement, Morrison's actions
were not seriously and repeatedly invasive of Sorensen's tenancy.
Cooking, watching television and typing are usual
residential activities, yet to Sorensen they were a source of
interference with his business. Morrison testified that once she
was made aware that her typing was disruptive, she ceased that
activity.

[R. 46]

She testified that the reason she was boiling

turkey parts for broth at night was that she felt uncomfortable
using the kitchen when her roommates were around and that she did
what she could to avoid them and to avoid conflict.

[R. 46]

Finally, Morrison testified that she did remove a note from the
front door of the premises and she admitted sending letters to
Sorensen proposing mediation and to the landlord explaining the
ongoing situation.

[R. 45-46]

Morrison testified that she

removed the note for the purpose of showing that note to the
property owner to prove a business was being run on the premises.
[R. 45]

She further testified that she sent letters to the

landlord and Sorensen in hopes of resolving the conflicts between
the roommates.

[R. 45-46]

Morrison's activities were reasonable

under the circumstances and cannot be characterized as seriously
14

invasive of Sorensenfs tenancy.
With the circumstances surrounding this tenancy in mind, and
after finding that Morrison's actions were not seriously or
repeatedly invasive of Sorensen's rights, the trial court should
have held, as a matter of law, that Morrison was not a nuisance.
CONCLUSION
This court should overturn the decision of the lower court
because Sorensen is not a landlord and therefore is not entitled
to relief under the unlawful detainer statute.
This court should clarify the nuisance standard applicable
to unlawful detainer actions and should hold, by applying such a
standard to the facts of this case, and given the facts as
determined by the trial court, that Morrison was not a nuisance.
Morrison asks this court to reverse the decision of the
Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^Tday of dfrlJ[

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES
Attorneys for Appellant

m/.
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) m aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under
Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree
or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to,
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity,
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review
and determination any matter over which the Court
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction*
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
19»

*v.v>.? m a » MJXC*

(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than
life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer:
(a) when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it,
after the expiration of the specified term or period for which it is let to him, which specified
term or period, whether established by express or
implied contract, or whether written or parol,
shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term or period;
(b) when, having leased real property for an
indefinite time with monthly or other periodic
rent reserved:
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after the end of any
month or period, in cases where the owner,
his designated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more prior to
the end of that month or period, has served
notice requiring him to quit the premises at
the expiration of that month or period; or
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he
remains in possession of the premises after
the expiration of a notice of not less than five
days;
(c) when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, after default in the payment of
any rent and after a notice in writing requiring
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the
surrender of the detained premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three
days after service, which notice may be served at
any time after the rent becomes due;
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease,
or commits or permits waste on the premises, or
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, or when he suffers,
permits, or maintains on or about the premises
any nuisance, including nuisance as defined in
Section 78-38-9, and remains in possession after
service upon him of a three days' notice to quit;
or
(e) when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held,
other than those previously mentioned, and after
notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
performance of the conditions or covenant or the
surrender of the property, served upon him and
upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the
premises remains uncomplied with for three days
after service. Within three days after the service
of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual
occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the
term, or other person interested in its continuance may perform the condition or covenant and
thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except
that if the covenants and conditions of the lease
violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be performed, then no notice need be given.
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a
mobile home is determined under Title 57, Chapter
16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act.
(3) The notice provisions for nuisance in Subsection 78-36-3(1 )(d) are not applicable to nuisance actions provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16
onlv.

ADDENDUM 2 - ]

78-36-5. Remedies available to tenant against
undertenant.
A tenant may take proceedings similar to those
prescribed in this chapter to obtain possession of the
premises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful
detention of the premises underlet to him.
1953

40 South 700 East - 1101
alt Lake City, Utah 84102
elephone: 575-5005
CIRCUIT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY,

STATE OP UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

2RRY SORENSEN,
Plaintiff,

]

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
i

[RIAM MORRISON,

1

Civil No. 930013247 CV
Judge Hutchings

Defendant.

The above-entitled

action came on regularly for hearing the 2nd day of

icember, 1993, the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings presiding and plaintiff appearing
person and by counsel James H. Deans/ and defendant appearing in person and by
tunsel Eric Mittelstadt, and the court having heard the testimony and arguments and
ving considered the evidence and good cause appearing now enters its Findings of
ct and Concluions of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That plaintiff and defendant are co-tenants and roommates at 7383

uth Union Park Avenue, Midvale, Utah.
2.

That plaintiff has served defendant with the 3-Day Notice to Vacate

ted November 4, 1993 attached as Exhibit "A" to plaintiff's complaint.
3.

That plaintiff may proceed against defendant although they are

-tenants, in nuisance pursuant to Section 78-38-1 U.C.A. and the landlord is not a

pessary party in this action, -jftu*^ <•$ <Z Cc\Ac(V$fc\A

Ccacky^ ^ f e t u Sr>c\«^m^_

^
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\t&

4.

That plaintiff and his witnesses testified to the items of nuisance

sted in the nuisance notice•
5.

That defendant testified that she was not a nuisance.

6.

That defendant did disrupt plaintiff's business activities and on at

>ast 25 occasions did not pass telephone messages on to plaintiff.
7.

That defendant did remove a note intended for plaintiff's business

8.

That defendant did unplug plaintiff's answering machine.

ssociates.

9.

That

defendant

did

conduct

activities

that

interfered

with

Laintiff's sleep.
10.

That defendant created a fire hazard in the premises by leaving the

urners on the stove on.
11.

That defendant has interfered with plaintiff's relationship with

is landlord by sending the landlord letters alleging that plaintiff used drugs.
12.

That all of these factors combined together persuades the court

.hat although it is a close case/ that plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that defendant is a nuisance as defined by Section 78-38-1 U.C.A. and that
:he nuisance can be abated by terminating defendant's tenancy.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That defendant's conduct constituted a nuisance and she must vacate

:he subject premises by December 17/ 1993 and thereafter plaintiff may enforce a Writ
Df Restitution to the subject premises.
2.

That defendant is to pay her portion of the rent due the landlord

through December/ 1993 and thereafter plaintiff is to assume full responsibility for
the

lease and hold defendant harmless from any payment due under the lease and

indemnify defendant for any non-performance of plaintiff under the lease.

ADDENDUM 4-2

3.

That plaintiff is to post a $500.00 cash bond in landlord's favor

unless landlord waives such a bond to secure plaintiff's performance under the lease.

mutually

4.

That plaintiff's counsel is to notify landlord of these proceedings.

5.

That the parties/ for the remaining days of defendant's tenancy/ are

restrained

from

annoying

or harassing

each other and

are

to

comport

themselves with courtesy towards each other.
DATED this

\ ( J day of December/ 1993.

ADDENDUM 4-^

tMES H. DEANS, #846
itorney foe Plaintiff
10 South 700 East - #101
lit Lake City/ Utah 84102
slephone: 575-5005
CIRCUIT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY,

STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

ORDER OF RESTITUTION

SRRY SORENSEN,
Plaintiff,

]

VS.

i

Civil No. 930013247 CV

IRIAM MORRISON,
1

Judge Hutchings

Defendant.

The above-entitled action came on regularly for hearing the 2nd day of
lecember, 1993, the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings presiding and plaintiff appearing
.n person and by counsel James H. Deans, and defendant appearing in person and by
zounsel Eric Mittelstadt, and the court having heard the testimony and arguments and
laving considered the evidence and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
}f Law and good cause appearing, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

That defendant's conduct constituted a nuisance and she must vacate

the subject premises by December 17, 1993 and thereafter plaintiff may enforce a Writ
of Restitution to the subject premises.
2.

That defendant is to pay her portion of the rent due the landlord

through December, 1993 and thereafter plaintiff is to assume full responsibility for
the lease and hold defendant harmless from any payment due under the lease and
indemnify defendant for any non-performance of plaintiff under the lease.

ADDENDUM 5-1

-23.

That plaintiff is to post a $500.00 cash bond in landlord's favor

unless landlord waives such a bond to secure plaintiff's performance under the lease.

nutually

4.

That plaintiff's counsel is to notify landlord of these proceedings.

5.

That the parties/ for the remaining days of defendant's tenancy/ are

restrained

from

annoying

or harassing

each other

and

are to

comport

:hemselves with courtesy towards each other.
DATED this

day of December/ 1993.

MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

ADDENDUM S-?

-3-

CBRTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Pindings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
md Order of Restitution
to the following/ postage prepaid/ this

3rd

day of

December/ 1993
Eric Mittelstadt
Attorney for Defendant
124 South 400 East - #400
Salt Lake City, OT 84111

^

